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This paper analyzes how individual-level assessments of the quality and functioning of the 
representative channel affect citizens’ likelihood to turn out to vote and to engage in 
alternative forms of non-institutionalized participation, and whether these relationships are 
moderated by individual resources as measured by education. Relying on novel data from the 
sixth round of the European Social Survey on how European citizens evaluate different 
aspects of democracy we show that negative evaluations of the quality of the representative 
channel discourage voting, but only promote participation in demonstrations among the 
highly educated. These findings highlight potential inequalities in citizens’ ability to voice 
their political demands: while highly educated individuals are likely to translate their 
negative evaluations of the institutional channel of representation into non-institutionalized 
forms of participation, in the presence of negative evaluations low educated individuals are 
simply more likely to withdraw from politics.  
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Political participation is a crucial characteristic of democracies, since it constitutes the main 
tool for citizens to channel their demands to policymakers. This is manifested in numerous 
studies that analyze the determinants of political participation. One strand of this research 
focuses on the impact of characteristics of the electoral process on citizens’ motivations to 
turn out to vote. This research has generally relied on macro-level factors, reflecting the 
competitiveness of elections or other characteristics of electoral systems, to account for the 
incentive structures surrounding specific elections (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 
1996; Franklin and Hirczy, 1998). Following a similar logic, recent studies have analyzed 
how individual-level assessments of the integrity of the electoral process affect citizens’ 
likelihood to participate in politics (Birch, 2010; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013; Norris, 2014). 
Combining the insights of these two literature strands, in this paper we construct a measure 
that captures Europeans’ assessments of the quality of the representative channel. Adapting 
the motivational approach to understanding political participation (see Norris, 2002, pp. 61–
72) and Verba et al. (1995) civic voluntarism model we argue, first, that these assessments 
affect citizens’ participation decisions by altering their motivations to engage in politics 
through different means, and, second, that individual resource inequalities play a moderating 
role in this process. 
 Citizens’ subjective assessments of how much they can influence governments’ 
composition and policymaking through elections should affect their motivations to express 
their demands through the representative channel. Hence, we expect that positive evaluations 
of the functioning of this channel will be positively related to participation in elections. When 
such evaluations are negative and, as a consequence, elections do not provide the proper 
means to influence policymaking, citizens might choose to engage in non-institutionalized 
forms of participation to voice their demands. Hence, positive evaluations of the quality of 
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the representative channel should relate negatively to the likelihood of demonstrating. 
However, from the literature on political participation we know that resources can moderate 
how and when motivations get translated into behavior, although differently for voting and 
demonstrating. As we argue below, these moderating effects might give raise to inequalities 
in political influence in the presence of a malfunctioning representative channel.   
 Our empirical analysis, based on novel data from European democracies, reveals that, 
on the one hand, there is a positive relationship between citizens’ assessment of the quality of 
the representative channel and their likelihood of turning out to vote. On the other hand, we 
find a negative correlation between these assessments and participation in demonstrations. 
Our hypotheses about the moderating role of individual resources are also confirmed. Results 
show that education is a significant moderator in the relationship between individual 
evaluations and participation in demonstrations, but not in the case of voting. An extension of 
this analysis reveals that when the representative channel is judged to be malfunctioning only 
those with higher education are more likely to resort to demonstrating as an alternative or 
supplemental form of expressing their demands, while those with lower levels of education 
are more likely to simply withdraw from politics.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. We first lay out the theoretical framework for the 
analysis of citizens’ assessments of the quality of the representative channel, and next we 
hypothesize how it relates to individual participation decisions. Next, we summarize the data 
and methods. Section four discusses the main results, while section five presents robustness 







2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES   
2.1 The quality of the representative channel  
There are different aspects of a political system that can affect the quality of the 
representative channel. We consider that in established democracies this quality is a function 
of four characteristics: the degree to which elections are conducted freely and fairly; the 
capacity of organized opposition parties to effectively contest elections; the ideological 
differentiation of political parties; and the decisiveness of elections in determining the 
composition of governments. These are aspects that are likely to modulate citizens’ capacity 
to transmit their political demands and affect policymaking through their vote. Hence, since 
participation is motivated by the will to exert influence over policymaking, citizens’ 
subjective evaluations of these different aspects should affect their motivations to participate 
in politics (see below).  
  Free and fair elections is the first condition that a democracy, where citizens are 
meant to exercise influence over policymakers through their votes, must fulfill. If elections 
are tampered in any way, or they are not celebrated in an environment free from coercion, 
citizens’ capacity to exercise influence over policymakers will be limited. As Birch (2010) 
argues, elections that are not free and fair are less meaningful and consequential. Hence, the 
quality of the representative channel depends, first, on whether elections are conducted in a 
free environment and the rules regarding the process are fairly applied.  
 Even if free elections are important to ensure that citizens can route their political 
demands through the representative channel this is by no means sufficient, since elections 
must also be contested. That is, opposition parties must be able to effectively compete with 
each other for votes to ensure that all of them have a real chance of winning office 
(Przeworski et al., 1996). To effectively compete in elections it is fundamental that all parties 
are free to criticize the government. If opposition parties are constrained in their capacity to 
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criticize government actions, opposition parties will only have a slim probability of 
effectively running for office.  
 In established democracies citizens’ capacity to transmit their demands through the 
representative channel not only depends on the integrity of the electoral process (i.e. elections 
being free and contested), but also on the ideological differentiation of political parties. One 
of the aspects that makes the choices in an election process meaningful is that the parties 
contesting it are distinguishable in terms of ideology (Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). In the 
presence of a sufficiently differentiated partisan offer it is likely that all sectors of society will 
be able to find a party that represents their interests and preferences (Norris, 2002). In its 
absence, some sectors of society will remain unable to express their true policy priorities 
through the conventional channel of representation, since they will find no party to vehicle 
their demands.  
 The different options offered to citizens, no matter how broad or narrow they are, 
become meaningless if citizens are not able to determine the composition of governments and 
reward and punish the incumbent government through their vote. That is, elections must be 
consequential and citizens must be capable of “throwing the rascals out” (Wessels and 
Schmitt, 2008). If this is the case, elections grant citizens the means to exercise control over 
political institutions and the political agenda through the representative channel (Morlino, 
2009). Conversely, if elections are not decisive citizens’ will not be able to sanction and hold 
the government accountable through their vote.   
 Empirically, earlier research documented the impact of characteristics of the electoral 
process such as the breadth of the partisan offer, the number of parties, the closeness of 
elections and the frequency of government change on aggregate turnout (Adams and Merrill, 
2003; Blais, 2006; Jackman, 1987; Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). While this work analyzed 
how macro-level characteristics of the electoral process and the institutional system affect 
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turnout by allegedly influencing individual incentives to vote, some recent studies have 
considered how individual assessments of aspects related to the integrity of the electoral 
process, mainly the freedom and fairness of elections, affect political engagement (Birch, 
2010; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013; Hiskey and Bowler, 2005; Levin and Alvarez, 2009; 
McCann and Domı́nguez, 1998; Norris, 2014). These studies have shown that when citizens 
judge that elections are conducted freely and fairly and the electoral process is not tampered 
they are more likely to vote and less likely to protest.  
 Although these studies constitute an important contribution because they moved from 
contextual factors to subjective evaluations of specific aspects of the electoral process, they 
have certain limitations. With the notable exceptions of Levin and Alvarez (2009) and Norris 
(2014), prior studies focus exclusively on voting, and disregard other forms of participation. 
More importantly, all these studies focus on evaluations of the integrity and incorruptibility 
of the electoral process, and most of them rely on a single indicator about trust in elections or 
the extent to which elections are conducted freely and fairly. 1  Electoral integrity 
considerations might be more relevant for citizens’ behavior in non-fully established 
democracies like those analyzed in most of these studies. 2  However, in a context of 
established democracies, where the prospects of elections being conducted in accordance 
with the highest democratic standards are high, we need to incorporate elements that go 
beyond electoral integrity and malpractice (e.g. the ideological differentiation between parties 
and the decisiveness of elections).3 Moreover, it is also necessary to consider these processes 






2.2 Evaluations of the quality of the representative channel, resources, and political 
participation  
Verba’s et al. (1995) civic voluntarism model underlines the importance of motivations, 
resources and mobilization for participation decisions. In this paper we focus on the first two 
sets of factors, and begin by considering how subjective evaluations of the quality of the 
representative channel relate to motivations to participate in politics. The motivational or 
instrumental model of political participation sustains that citizens are rational actors who 
intend to affect the course of public policy through their actions (Franklin, 1996; Norris, 
2002, pp. 61–72). Although it might appear naïve for individual citizens to expect to 
influence policymaking through their individual behavior, research has shown that the desire 
to influence policies is among the most relevant considerations motivating citizens’ 
participation in elections and demonstrations (Verba et al., 1995). Hence, citizens’ 
assessment of the probability that their actions will have any impact on policymaking should 
influence their decisions to participate, as well as the means through which they participate 
(see Birch (2010); Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013); Norris (2014) for a related view).  
 The quality of the representative channel modulates the extent to which citizens are 
able to vehicle their political demands through institutionalized means of participation. In the 
absence of free, competitive and decisive elections, or ideologically differentiated partisan 
alternatives citizens will have a low capacity to influence policymaking through the 
conventional channel. If citizens perceive that the representative channel does not work well, 
they should consider that their vote is less likely to be effective in transferring their demands 
to the political system. Hence, given that motivations to ultimately affect policymaking will 
play a central role in citizens’ participation decisions, we expect that more positive 
evaluations of the quality of the representative channel will be positively associated with the 
likelihood of turning out to vote (H1).  
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 A logical consequence derived from our first hypothesis is that those with negative 
evaluations of the representative channel will be less likely to turn out to vote. However, even 
when the evaluations of the representative channel are negative, citizens might still desire to 
influence the political process. Protest has become increasingly present in contemporary 
democracies, and it constitutes an important tool to exert influence over policymaking 
(Dalton et al., 2010). Historically, demonstrations have been a tool for those lacking access 
through the conventional channel of representation, and studies of protest argue that with 
limited means of conventional political access citizens’ likelihood to demonstrate may 
increase (Dalton et al., 2010; Kitschelt, 1986; Marien and Christensen, 2013). Hence, as 
citizens perceive the conventional channels to be blocked or inadequate, they may opt to 
vehicle their demands through demonstrations, either in addition to or as an alternative to 
voting. As a consequence, we expect that more negative evaluations of the quality of the 
representative channel will be positively associated with the likelihood of participating in 
demonstrations (H2).  
       Although a citizen might or might not participate in elections and take part in 
demonstrations depending on how she evaluates the functioning of the representative 
channel, this choice is constrained by her individual resources and the different resource 
demands imposed upon her by each of the forms of participation. This implies that the role of 
motivations stemming from subjective assessments of the quality of the representative 
channel cannot be analyzed in isolation, and that one must also consider the role played by 
individual resources that are relevant for particular forms of political participation. Previous 
research has recognized the importance of personal resources to explain political 
participation. Resources such as education or income enable citizens to participate, since they 
provide the necessary skills and means to be active in politics (Verba et al., 1995).  
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Resources have not only been considered a direct correlate of participation, but also a 
moderating factor, affecting the relationship between political grievances or motivations and 
actual political actions. Following the argument put forward by Gamson (1968), the 
relationship between grievances and participation is considered to involve complex 
interactions (Levi and Stoker, 2000), since resources are assumed to be necessary for 
individuals to translate motivations into action. One strand within this literature has focused 
on the moderating effect of resources such as education or income (Chan, 1997; Citrin, 1977; 
Kriesi and Westholm, 2007), while others have predominantly focused on the moderating 
effect of political attitudes such as political interest, political efficacy, or regime support 
(Christensen, 2014; Craig and Maggiotto, 1981; Hooghe and Marien, 2013).  
 In comparison to other forms of participation, demonstrations are considerably more 
demanding in terms of resources (Dalton, 2006, pp. 73–74). As a consequence, not all 
citizens that asses the quality of the representative channel negatively will be equally likely to 
reroute their political demands through demonstrations. Protests and other direct action 
methods are considered high information activities, and, as such, the requirements to 
participate in terms of civic skills are higher than for other forms of participation (Dalton, 
2000, pp. 929–930). These civic skills are fostered by citizens’ education (Verba et al., 1995). 
Thus, education is likely to affect citizens’ capacity to grasp and exploit the opportunities to 
influence the policymaking process through demonstrations. We hence expect more negative 
evaluations of the quality of the representative channel to have a stronger effect on the 
likelihood to demonstrate for those who are more educated (H3). In fact, it might be that 
(when holding negative evaluations of the representative channel) only those who are more 
educated are able to add another form of participation to their political repertoire or to bypass 
the representative channel altogether to ensure that their demands are channeled into the 
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political system. That is, a minimum level of education might be necessary for individuals to 
be able to resort to alternative means of participation.   
 In contrast to demonstrations, voting is one of the most common and least demanding 
forms of participation, since the act of voting makes only modest demands on citizens in 
terms of cognitive and material resources (Verba et al., 1995). In comparison to other forms 
of participation, voting has a “low-cost” nature (Aarts and Wessels, 2005, p. 81). Research on 
the determinants of voting in Europe has shown that there is barely any educational effect for 
voting and that, as a consequence, voting can be considered one of the most democratic forms 
of participation (Marien et al., 2010). Topf (1995) argued that since the 1960s all Europeans 
appear to possess the skills to participate in national elections. Hence, while educational 
attainment generates pronounced unequal participation patterns in most non-institutionalized 
forms of political participation, people of all educational levels participate at similar rates in 
elections (Marien et al., 2010, p. 197; Teorrell et al., 2007, p. 395).4 As a consequence, we do 
not expect educational attainment to moderate the association between respondents’ 
evaluations of the representative channel and their likelihood to turn out to vote. Hence, we 
should not find any differences in the effect of evaluations of the representative channel on 
the likelihood of voting for individuals with different levels of education (H4). That is, the 
impact of negative evaluations on the likelihood of withdrawing from electoral participation 
should be the same across individuals with different levels of education.  
 If confirmed, our first two hypotheses imply that negative evaluations of the quality 
of the representative channel should not be considered a threat for the correct functioning of 
contemporary democracies. Those who hold negative evaluations would not withdraw from 
politics altogether, but they would just be more likely to adjust the way in which they channel 
their demands into the political system. The “critical citizens” thesis argues that dissatisfied 
citizens may eschew institutionalized forms of participation to engage instead in protest 
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activities. Within this framework, a critical outlook towards the functioning of political 
institutions is not seen as a symptom or precursor of political alienation, but as a healthy 
attitude, which, even if it may discourage participation through conventional means, it is also 
likely to motivate citizens’ to remain vigilant and engage in alternative forms of political 
participation (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 2001; Norris, 1999; Rosanvallon, 2008). Although 
this conclusion would be reassuring, this might not always be the case.  
 Our third and fourth hypotheses imply that more negative assessments of the 
functioning of the representative channel would entail that all citizens, independently of their 
level of education, would be less likely to vote. However, negative evaluations would only 
imply a greater likelihood to demonstrate for those who are more educated. As a 
consequence, for those who are less educated, negative evaluations would entail an 
increasing likelihood of withdrawing from politics (i.e. political alienation). Conversely, for 
those who are more educated, negative evaluations imply that these individuals are more 
likely to participate in demonstrations, and this could be done as an alternative to voting or in 
addition to it. 
It is possible that those who demonstrate more as their perceptions of the 
representative channel worsen still participate in elections, since citizens can also express 
dissatisfaction through voting (e.g. by casting a vote for protest parties). In fact, recent 
studies suggest that protest might be an instrument that some citizens add up to their 
participation repertoires, instead of being a tool predominantly used by those who decide to 
withdraw from conventional politics (Saunders, 2014). In terms of the participation outcomes 
we study, we expect that given their lack of resources individuals with lower levels of 
education will simply withdraw from politics when they have negative perceptions of how 
the representative channel works. At the same time, we expect those with higher education to 
be more likely to adapt their behavior either by only demonstrating, or by incorporating this 
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form of participation to their repertoire as a way of adding strength to their voices in the 
presence of a malfunctioning representative channel. Hence, the joint consideration of both 
motivations and resources leads us to expect that only a resourceful fraction of the population 
will behave as the ideal “critical citizen”, who does not withdraw from the political process in 
the presence of a malfunctioning representative channel. 	
	
3. DATA AND METHODS  
Our empirical analyses draw on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross-
national survey frequently used to study political participation. In its sixth round, conducted 
between 2012 and 2013 in 29 countries, the ESS includes a rotating module in which citizens 
are asked to evaluate different elements of their democracies, among them several aspects 
related to the functioning of the representative channel.5 This rotating module inquires to 
what extent citizens evaluate that, in their countries, elections are free and fair, opposition 
parties are free to criticize the government, parties offer clear alternatives to one another, and 
government parties that have done a bad job while in office are punished in elections.6  
 The main independent variable (individual evaluations of the quality of the 
representative channel) is operationalized with these four survey items. This 
operationalization is consistent with the discussion in the theory section, which summarizes 
the theoretical rationale underpinning the aggregation of these different indicators. The 
empirical analysis confirms that these indicators can be combined into a single measure. An 
exploratory factor analysis (table 1) yields a one-factor solution, with only one factor 
extracted with an eigenvalue higher than one, and with all indicators loading strongly on this 
single dimension.7 The Cronbach’s alpha for these indicators equals 0.72. We estimate our 
main independent variable based on the factor scores, which take higher values for better 
evaluations of the quality of the representative channel. The resulting index ranges between  
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(-1.7) and (0.9), with Kosovo being the country with the lowest/worst average evaluations 




 With regard to our dependent variables, voting takes the value 1 for those who voted 
in the last national election and 0 for those who did not.9  Following Saunders’ (2014) 
recommendations, we restrict our analysis to participation in demonstrations without 
incorporating to our measure any other non-conventional activity. The demonstration variable 
takes the value 1 for those who participated in lawful demonstrations in the last 12 months 
and the value of 0 for those who did not. These two variables are combined to generate our 
third dependent variable which classifies respondents in four different categories: neither 
votes nor demonstrates, only votes, only demonstrates, votes and demonstrates.  
 Together with the evaluations of the representative channel, education is a key 
independent variable. The ESS includes two measures of education. A categorical variable 
capturing the highest level of education achieved by a respondent, and a continuous variable 
measuring the number of years a respondent spent in full time education. Although the latter 
has been extensively used in political science research, survey and education research 
questioned its use in cross-national analyses (Müller, 2008; Schneider, 2007). As a 
consequence, we rely on the ISCED categorical education variable to group respondents in 
three categories: primary education or less, secondary education, and university education.  
 All models include a control variable that identifies respondents that support any of 
the parties in government. It is important to account for the potential confounding effect of 
“winners and losers”, since being a winner affects citizens’ assessment of the fairness of 
elections (Birch, 2008), while at the same time it might also alter citizens’ decisions to join 
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demonstrations (Anderson and Mendes, 2006). Hence, those who identify with a government 
party receive the value 1 while those who do not, either because they identify with another 
party or do not identify with any party, receive the value 0.10 Other variables that have been 
shown to affect the propensity to participate in politics are included in the analyses as 
additional controls. Political interest is used as a proxy for citizens’ intrinsic motivations to 
participate in politics. Feeling about current income is introduced as a control for the impact 
of monetary resources. In order to account for citizens’ embedment in mobilization networks, 
two variables measuring whether respondents are members of unions or whether they work or 
participate in any other kind of organization are used. Finally, age and gender are also 
included in all models. 
 We estimate models in which the dependent variable is binary through logistic 
regression, and models in which the dependent variable has four categories through 
multinomial logistic regression. Listwise deletion is used in all models. Our data has a 
hierarchical structure (individuals nested into countries). Since our interest is to estimate the 
effects of level-1 predictors (individual level factors) we take into account the hierarchical 
structure of the data by estimating country fixed-effects models. Fixed-effects are warranted 
in our case since this approach controls for country-level heterogeneity and takes care of the 
nesting of units, allowing us to concentrate on the effects of individual level predictors 
(Allison, 2009; Huang, 2014; Möhring, 2012). The advantage of fixed-effects over the 
common alternative of random-intercepts (multilevel) models is that this approach is 
conservative and parsimonious, since it controls for unobserved differences between 
countries through a series of country-dummies, and does not require us to assume that the 






Our first hypotheses refer to the association between evaluations of the quality of the 
representative channel and the likelihood of voting and demonstrating. Table 2 summarizes 
the results from four logistic regression models with vote and participation in demonstrations 
specified as the dependent variables.12 The first key findings from these analyses are the 
coefficients associated to the evaluations in the first and the second model. These coefficients 
provide initial support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Evaluations are positively associated to voting 
and negatively associated to participation in demonstrations, with both coefficients being 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Hence, more negative evaluations of the quality of 





For a better assessment of these effects figures 1 and 2 plot the average adjusted 
predictions of voting and demonstrating (respectively) for different values of the evaluations. 
The adjusted prediction of voting changes by 0.10 points when moving from the lowest to the 
highest level of the evaluations. The probability of voting for a person with the worst 
evaluation is 0.72 and it increases to 0.82 when the evaluation takes the highest value.13 This 
substantial change in the likelihood of voting is similar to the one estimated by Birch (2010) 
for her measure of perceptions of electoral fairness, and stronger than the one estimated by 
Carreras & İrepoğlu (2013) for Latin American countries. To further evaluate the significance 
of this change we compare it to one of the most relevant attitudinal predictors of voting: 
political interest. The analysis reveals that the estimated change in the probability of voting is 
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higher than the one associated to moving from being hardly interested in politics to being 
quite interested in politics. 
 
<FIGURES 1 AND 2 > 
 
In the case of participation in demonstrations the change in the adjusted prediction is 
smaller when moving from one extreme of the evaluation index to the other. The adjusted 
prediction of demonstrating is 0.10 for those with the worst evaluations, and it decreases to 
0.06 when the evaluation index takes its maximum value, a change of just 0.04 points. Hence, 
while H1 is clearly confirmed by these results, H2 is only weakly supported. It is possible that 
the marginal effect of the evaluations of the representative channel is smaller when 
explaining participation in demonstrations than voting because, as we hypothesized above, in 
the case of demonstrations we expect this effect to vary according to educational levels, with 
flatter slopes for those with low levels of education. 
The third and fourth hypotheses focus on the moderating effect of education on the 
association between evaluations of the representative channel, voting and participating in 
demonstrations. Models 3 and 4 in table 2 summarize the results of the two interactive 
models specified to test these hypotheses. In both cases the evaluations of the quality of the 
representative channel have been interacted with education levels (with the level of primary 
education or less set as the reference category). The coefficients reported in model 4 reveal 
that in the case of participation in demonstrations the interactive effect between the 
evaluations and secondary and tertiary education are both significant at least at the 0.01 level. 
However, these interactive terms fail to reach conventional levels of significance in the 
model in which voting is specified as the dependent variable (model 3). These results provide 
preliminary support for H3 and H4. However, since interactive effects in logistic regression 
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models are not easily interpreted by raw coefficients we turn to figures 3 and 4 for a better 




Figure 3 summarizes the average adjusted predictions of voting for different levels of 
the evaluation factor and education (computed from model 3). The slopes for the different 
education categories are similar. Although the absolute probability values are different for the 
three groups (with tertiary educated individuals showing greater predispositions to vote) the 
marginal increase in the likelihood of turning out to vote when the evaluation of the quality 
of the representative channel improves is similar across education levels. Moving from the 
lowest to the highest point in the evaluation scale increases the probability of voting by 0.11 
points for those with tertiary education, by 0.10 points for those with secondary education, 
and by 0.11 points for those with primary education or less. Hence, education does not appear 





Figure 4 summarizes the average adjusted predictions of participating in 
demonstrations for different values of the evaluation factor and levels of education. A 
comparison of figures 3 and 4 clearly highlights the relevance of the moderating effect of 
education on the likelihood of participating in demonstrations. While in the previous figure 
there were barely any differences in the slopes for the different levels of education, we find 
substantial variation in the marginal effects of the evaluations on the likelihood of 
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participating in demonstrations for the three different levels of education considered. For 
those with university education, the adjusted prediction of participating in demonstrations 
decreases by more than 50 percent as evaluations of the quality of the representative channel 
improve (from 0.15 for the worst evaluations to 0.07 for the best evaluations). These 
predicted probabilities also decrease for those with secondary education, but the change is 
considerably smaller (from 0.09 to 0.06). In the case of individuals with primary education or 
less the relationship between evaluations of the representative channel and the probability to 
participate in demonstrations not only is different (as we hypothesized) but it also changes 
signs and becomes positive, with the predicted probabilities rising from 0.03 for the most 
negative evaluations to 0.07 for the most positive.15 To assess the significance of these effects 
we compare them again to one of the most important attitudinal predictors of engagement in 
demonstrations: political interest. In the case of individuals with university education the 
change associated with moving from the best to the worst evaluations (0.08 increase in the 
likelihood of demonstrating) appears to be substantial, since it is similar to the change 
associated with moving from being not at all interested in politics to being very interested in 
politics (0.09 increase in the likelihood of demonstrating).  
 We have shown how variation in the evaluations of the quality of the representative 
channel, moderated by educational attainment, is associated to the probability of voting and 
demonstrating separately. In the next step of the analysis, we consider the role of these 
variables on a typology of participation that can take four different values. Respondents can 
either: only vote, neither vote nor demonstrate, only demonstrate, or both vote and 
demonstrate. The classification reveals that most respondents only vote (70 percent of the 
sample) or neither vote nor demonstrate (23 percent).16 In line with Saunders (2014), among 
those who demonstrate (7 percent of the sample), 16 percent only demonstrate and 84 percent 
both vote and demonstrate. 17  This classification of respondents according to what 
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combination of these two activities they perform allows us to investigate further the impact of 
evaluations on political involvement, and, more importantly, to determine if negative 
evaluations can be considered a mobilizing or an alienating factor depending on citizens’ 
resources. Table 3 summarizes the results of two multinomial logistic models in which only 
votes is set as the base outcome.  
 
<TABLE 3 >  
 
The first model replicates the non-interactive specification using the categorical 
dependent variable. The results reveal that more positive evaluations of the quality of the 
representative channel encourage only voting versus all other possible outcomes. The 
negative coefficients of the evaluations for the comparisons of neither votes nor 
demonstrates, demonstrates only and votes and demonstrates with respect to only voting 
imply that the chances of only voting relative to these three categories are higher as 
evaluations improve. The association is the strongest for the comparison between only voting 
and only demonstrating. A one unit increase in the evaluations factor (which corresponds to a 
two standard deviations change) decreases the odds of only demonstrating versus only voting 
by 45 percent, while this change in the odds is of 20 percent for voting and demonstrating, 
and of 24 percent for neither voting nor demonstrating. Hence, worsening evaluations of the 
quality of the representative channel are associated with the possibility of not participating 
(neither votes nor demonstrates category), but also clearly associated to the possibility of 
engaging in demonstrations (demonstrates only category), or even of supplementing electoral 
participation with participation in demonstrations (votes and demonstrates category). Our 
previous analysis suggests that individuals’ resources are likely to play an important role for 
which of the three possible alternatives citizens opt for.   
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 The second model introduces the interactive term between the evaluations and 
educational attainment. In accordance with the evidence for H4 examined above, we find that 
there is no moderating effect of education on the relationship between the evaluations and the 
probability of only voting versus neither voting nor demonstrating. More negative 
evaluations of the representative channel increase the odds of neither voting nor 
demonstrating (versus only voting) to a similar extent independently of educational 
attainment. There is, however, a significant moderating role of education for the likelihood of 
only demonstrating, and of voting and demonstrating versus only voting. Negative 
evaluations of the representative channel only increase the odds of voting and demonstrating 
for those respondents with secondary or university education. While positive evaluations do 
not significantly decrease the odds of voting and demonstrating versus only voting for those 
with primary education (as revealed by the coefficient for the evaluations constitutive term in 
the interaction), an increase in two standard deviations in the evaluations factor decreases the 
odds of voting and demonstrating versus only voting by 41 percent for those with secondary 
education relative to those with primary, and by 51 percent for those with university 
education relative to those with only primary.18 Similarly, while positive evaluations hardly 
have any impact on the odds of demonstrating only versus only voting for those with primary 
education, for those with university education the odds of only demonstrating versus only 
voting decrease by 57 percent for an increase in two standard deviations of the evaluations 
factor (compared to those with primary education or less). For those with secondary 
education these odds decrease by 42 percent compared to those with primary education, 
although in this case the difference between these two groups is not statistically significant.19 
These results confirm the findings based on two separate measures of participation 
and show that in the presence of negative evaluations only those who possess greater 
resources are more likely to react by engaging in demonstrations, either as an alternative or as 
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a complement to voting. For those respondents with lower levels of education, variation on 
evaluations of the quality of the representative channel only significantly alter their 
likelihood of either voting (when evaluations are good) or withdrawing from politics (when 
they are bad). Hence, negative evaluations should be considered as either a mobilizing or 
alienating factor depending on individuals’ resources.  
 
5. LIMITATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
Like most studies analyzing attitudes and behavior, our analyses are susceptible of being 
affected by endogeneity. 20  Respondents might rationalize and edit their answers to the 
attitudinal questions according to their behavior. For example, it is possible that respondents 
who did not vote provide worst evaluations of the representative channel to appear consistent, 
avoid cognitive dissonance, or justify a socially undesirable behavior (Birch, 2010; Norris, 
2014). The act of voting itself might also reinforce citizens’ evaluations of the functioning of 
the representative channel. Although Birch (2010) showed, using UK panel data, that prior 
perceptions of electoral fairness affect subsequent voting decisions, in our case endogeneity 
might bias some of our results, especially in the case of voting.  
 If endogeneity biases our findings, it is more likely to affect some of the variables of 
our index of the quality of the representative channel than others. Of the four questions we 
use to operationalize evaluations of the representative channel only one directly refers to the 
electoral process (elections being conducted freely and fairly). The remaining three questions 
ask respondents about their opinion on elements that are related to the functioning of the 
representative channel, but without explicitly mentioning elections. As a consequence, the 
likelihood of respondents rationalizing and editing their answers according to their behaviors 
should be lower for these three questions. We exploit this feature of the dataset in order to 
assess the robustness of our findings.   
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 Tables in appendix B replicate our models with an evaluation variable generated from 
a factor analysis that excludes the free elections question. Overall, our findings are robust to 
the use of this alternative specification. Only in the case of the model in which voting is 
specified as the dependent variable the effects of the evaluations weaken, but still remain 
significant. This might suggest that, for voting, a share of the direct effects we estimate could 
be endogenous. However, the interaction effects are not modified. For participation in 
demonstrations the results are also unaltered by the different specification of the main 
independent variable. Lastly, in the case of the multinomial logistic analysis, the results are 
only slightly weaker. Hence, in spite of the inherent limitations of cross-sectional data to 
address potential endogeneity biases, these analyses increase our confidence in the robustness 
of our findings, by showing that the exclusion of the question most susceptible of being 
affected by this bias does not substantially alter our findings.   
 Another limitation of our paper stems from the fact that we consider only one form of 
non-conventional participation (demonstrations), and citizens may rely on other forms of 
non-conventional participation to channel their demands to policymakers. Although different 
forms of non-conventional participation may not be entirely comparable (Saunders, 2014), 
we re-specify our demonstration variable to include a larger number of non-conventional 
actions, and we re-estimate all our models.21 The results (available upon request) are very 
similar to the ones obtained with the measure based on demonstrations only. Negative 
evaluations of the quality of representative channel are associated with a greater likelihood of 







6. CONCLUSION  
With this paper we contribute to the field of political participation studies by implementing a 
measure that captures one of the determinants of citizens’ motivations to engage in politics: 
their evaluations of the quality of the representative channel. Our initial hypothesis contended 
that those citizens who evaluate positively the functioning of the representative channel 
should be more motivated to vote. At the same time, those who evaluate it negatively should 
be more likely to choose extra-institutional forms of participation as a mechanism to channel 
their demands into the political system. Our empirical results support these initial hypotheses 
but with certain caveats, namely that individual resources play an important moderating role 
in the case of participation in demonstrations. 
 In line with studies analyzing attitudes on electoral integrity (e.g. Carreras and 
İrepoğlu, 2013; Norris, 2014), our results indicate that negative evaluations of the 
representative channel increase the likelihood of withdrawing from electoral politics. Yet, our 
analyses also add further nuances to the relationship between evaluations of institutional 
channels of representation and political participation by showing the presence of a 
moderating effect of education in how these assessments relate to participation in 
demonstrations, but an absence of this effect for voting. These results underline the 
importance of considering these specific attitudes in light of the potential moderating role of 
individual resources and the different resources demands of each form of political 
participation. Our analyses also point to the pertinence of going beyond electoral integrity 
considerations when accounting for individual assessments of the functioning of the 
representative channel, especially more so when studying established democracies. 
 These findings also have broader implications for the functioning of European 
democracies. For those who are more educated, negative evaluations of the quality of the 
representative channel are less likely to imply a withdrawal from the political process, 
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because these citizens have a greater likelihood of adapting the repertoire through which they 
vehicle their demands into the political system. Conversely, for those with low levels of 
education, negative evaluations are more likely to imply a withdrawal from the political 
process altogether. For these citizens, who have fewer resources to engage in demanding 
forms of political participation, negative evaluations are not translated into a greater 
likelihood to engage in demonstrations and, in the same way as for those who are more 
educated, they are associated with a lower likelihood to vote. This finding qualifies the 
optimistic view of the “critical citizens” thesis, which contends that in post-industrial 
societies negative orientations towards the political system might not be problematic for the 
functioning of democracy, since those who are dissatisfied, disenchanted or critical are more 
likely to change their repertoire of political actions but they will not withdraw from politics. 
Our findings show that, whenever the channel of representative politics is judged to be 
malfunctioning, only the most resourceful citizens are likely to reroute their political 
demands through alternative channels. Hence, a low quality of the representative channel is 
more likely to politically alienate those with fewer resources.  
 Given that political participation is one of the main mechanisms linking citizens’ 
preferences to the policymaking process, the logical implication of these findings is that 
when perceptions of the representative channel are negative not all citizens are equally likely 
of making their voices heard. This would violate democracy’s ideal that all citizens’ needs 
and preferences should be given equal consideration, since there is evidence that policy 
makers are likely to neglect the preferences of those groups that are less likely to participate 
(Bartels, 2008). There are, however, alternative forms of political participation other than 
demonstrating that could mitigate these inequalities in the presence of negative evaluations, 
as long as engagement in them is not conditional on individual resources. A succinct analysis 
of other forms of participation included in the ESS indicates that inequalities are also 
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apparent in them, but further research should analyze other emerging forms of participation 
(e.g. online participation). Besides considering other forms of political participation, further 
extensions of these analyses could consider the role played by contextual factors (e.g. the 
strength of mobilization agents or characteristics of the political opportunity structure) in how 
negative perceptions of the representative channel relate to participation decisions, and how 




1 Although still focusing on the integrity of the electoral process Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) and Norris (2014) 
rely on more than one indicator to operationalize their electoral integrity/malpractice measures. 
2  The studies by Hiskey and Bowler (2005), and Levin and Alvarez (2009) focused on Mexico where 
allegations of electoral fraud have been common in the last decades. Carreras & İrepoğlu (2013) focused on 
Latin American countries, which clearly differ in their levels of democracy. Although Norris’ (2014) analysis 
adopted a global outlook, a great number of the 18 countries included in her sample cannot be considered full 
democracies as attested by their scores in Freedom House indexes, and the few established democracies 
included in her analysis (Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Uruguay) functioned as a control 
(Norris 2014: 64). The exception to this pattern is Birch’s (2010) study, which included a great number of 
established democracies.  
3	Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013 p. 612) show that while distrust in the fairness of elections is quite high in regions 
like Latin America this is not the case in Europe. 		
4	Some recent studies challenge the view that differences in turnout across education groups are small in all 
countries. Gallego (2015) uncovered substantial country differences in turnout inequalities related to education. 
Likewise, Armingeon and Schädel (2015) recently argued that there are remarkable cross-country and temporal 
differences with respect to voting inequalities related to education. In any case, Gallego (2015: 25) points that in 
most countries the overall differences in turnout rates for citizens with different levels of education are moderate 
in size, and Armingeon and Schädel (2015) identify an average difference in turnout rates between those with 
the highest and the lowest education of just 4.9 percent (for the 1999-2009 decade).    
5 Our final sample includes 27 countries. We exclude Russia and Ukraine because they cannot be considered 
fully democratic. None of these countries had a score above 6 in the Polity IV dataset .We exclude countries that 
are not fully democratic because voting and demonstrating, as well as answers to questions related to the 
functioning of democracy, might be distorted by the non-democratic character of these regimes.  






7	The same factor solution is obtained when factor analyzing these indicators in each of the countries separately. 
In all countries only one factor with an eigenvalue higher than one is extracted, and in all cases all indicators 
have a factor loading above the 0.3 threshold.   
8	If instead of relying on the factor scores we rely on an index obtained through the sum of the four indicators 
we obtain very similar results that lead us to the same conclusions for all the analyses presented below (results 
available upon request).   
9  Respondents not eligible to vote have been excluded from all the analyses.  
10	This choice is motivated by the fact that it is not possible to directly measure winner/loser status according to 
the party voted by the respondent, because this variable predicts success perfectly in non-linear models in which 
voting is specified as the dependent variable. 	
11	To ensure that our results are not driven by our model estimation decisions we replicate all the analyses using 
random-intercepts logistic and multinomial logistic models. Empty random-intercepts models reveal that the 
amount of variance at the country level is 8.6 percent for voting, and 13.7 percent for demonstrating. Following 
recent analysis of political participation (Braun and Hutter, 2014; Dalton et al., 2010; Marien and Christensen, 
2013) we introduce in these models a country-level control for the openness of the political system. To 
operationalize this variable we follow Dalton et al., (2010) who rely on the World Bank rule of law indicator to 
measure system openness. This choice is motivated by this being the only system openness proxy (among the 
ones used in previous studies) that is available for all the countries in our sample. These multilevel models also 
include a country-level variable measuring the enforcement of compulsory voting in national elections. These 
models, which can be found in appendix C, do not alter the substantive results and lead us to the same 
conclusions.  
12  Independent variables are rescaled so that numeric inputs represent the effect of the mean ±1 standard 
deviation. Binary predictors are not rescaled.   
13	We have re-estimated these predictions relying on adjusted predictions at representative values (APRs) 
instead of average adjusted predictions (AAPs). We have estimated APRs of the likelihood of turning out to 
vote for a young individual with a low level of political interest. In this case the adjusted predictions of voting 
change from 0.46 for an individual with the worst evaluations to 0.62 for and individual with the best 
evaluations. That is, in this case the change in the adjusted prediction of turning out to vote is of 0.16.  
14	In the case of voting a contrast of the statistical significance of the average marginal effects of the evaluations 
reveals that there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of the evaluations between the three 
education groups. 
15	In the case of demonstrating	a contrast of the statistical significance of the average marginal effects of the 
evaluations reveals that there are statistically significant differences in the effect of the evaluations between all 
these three education groups. The negative average marginal effects of the evaluations are statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level for those with secondary and university education. The positive average marginal 






16	The high proportion of voters in the sample is likely to be caused by turnout overestimation due to social 
desirability bias.		
17	Even if only 503 respondents fall in the only demonstrates category, it is meaningful to separate those 
respondents from those who both vote and demonstrate since their attitudinal profile is likely to be quite 
different (e.g. they should have more negative evaluations of the functioning of representative channel than 
those who both vote and demonstrate).  
18	For those with university and secondary education, the average marginal effects associated to a one-unit 
change in the evaluations factor indicate that, for them, more negative evaluations statistically significantly 
increase the likelihood of both voting and demonstrating, while this is not the case for those with primary 
education.  	
19	As in the previous case, for those with university and secondary education, the average marginal effects 
associated to a one-unit change in the evaluations factor indicate that, for them, more negative evaluations 
statistically significantly increase the likelihood of demonstrating only, while this is not the case for those with 
primary education.  .	
20 Birch (2010) and Norris (2014) acknowledge this potential pitfall when analyzing the relationship between 
electoral integrity and political participation. 	
21 This variable measuring non-conventional activity takes the value 1 if the respondent performed any of the 
following actions in the last twelve months: joined a demonstration, boycotted a product or signed a petition. 
The categorical variable of participation is also re-estimated with the category of only demonstrates becoming 
























































































































To what extent in your country…     Loadings 
National elections are free and fair   0.7865 
Opposition parties are free to criticize government   0.7618 
Parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job   0.6921 
Parties offer clear alternatives to one another   0.7117 
Note: Entries are the result of a principal-component factor analysis. 1 component extracted, 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Vote Demonstrate Vote Demonstrate 
Evaluations 0.274*** -0.227*** 0.268** 0.329* 
 (9.347) (-4.874) (3.298) (2.008) 
Education (cat). Reference: primary     
Secondary 0.164** 0.257** 0.162*** 0.245** 
 (3.279) (2.810) (3.187) (2.666) 
University 0.591*** 0.578*** 0.594*** 0.570*** 
 (10.30) (6.010) (10.24) (5.920) 
Interaction: Evaluation * Education     
Evaluation * Secondary   -0.0138 -0.526** 
   (-0.160) (-3.059) 
Evaluation * University   0.0800 -0.723*** 
   (0.800) (-4.082) 
Supports winner 1.003*** -0.0846 1.003*** -0.0811 
 (22.98) (-1.643) (22.96) (-1.576) 
Political interest 1.052*** 0.949*** 1.052*** 0.949*** 
 (33.72) (20.58) (33.71) (20.57) 
Association member  0.438*** 1.141*** 0.438*** 1.139*** 
 (8.619) (23.13) (8.609) (23.09) 
Female -0.126*** 0.0449 -0.127*** 0.0458 
 (-4.671) (1.088) (-4.703) (1.108) 
Age 0.935*** -0.736*** 0.934*** -0.735*** 
 (29.64) (-14.67) (29.61) (-14.63) 
Union member 0.482*** 0.645*** 0.482*** 0.646*** 
 (10.50) (12.48) (10.49) (12.51) 
Feeling about income -0.308*** 0.185*** -0.309*** 0.186*** 
 (-10.07) (3.901) (-10.10) (3.924) 
Constant 1.962*** -3.228*** 1.961*** -3.219*** 
 (17.63) (-20.54) (17.58) (-20.44) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nagelkerke R2 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.20 
Observations 40,381 40,381 40,381 40,381 
z-statistics in parentheses          
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  Non-interactive model   Interactive model 
Reference category: Only votes 




 Votes and 
demonstrates  




 Votes and 
demonstrates 
         
Evaluations -0.268*** -0.600*** -0.217***  -0.263** -0.0151 0.342 
 (-8.907) (-5.799) (-4.244)  (-3.181) (-0.042) (1.867) 
Education (cat). Reference: primary        
Secondary -0.148** -0.112 0.292**  -0.143** -0.191 0.294** 
 (-2.900) (-0.544) (2.899)  (-2.761) (-0.908) (2.909) 
University -0.583*** -0.0771 0.584***  -0.580*** -0.194 0.595*** 
 (-9.899) (-0.349) (5.558)  (-9.735) (-0.858) (5.640) 
Interaction: Evaluation * Education        
Evaluation * Secondary     0.0132 -0.543 -0.533** 
     (0.150) (-1.436) (-2.776) 
Evaluation * University     -0.0685 -0.838* -0.711*** 
     (-0.665) (-2.112) (-3.617) 
Supports winner -1.018*** -0.854*** -0.122*  -1.018*** -0.850*** -0.119* 
 (-22.69) (-5.050) (-2.280)  (-22.68) (-5.025) (-2.221) 
Political Interest -1.060*** 0.0880 0.874***  -1.060*** 0.0882 0.874*** 
 (-32.74) (0.827) (17.24)  (-32.73) (0.829) (17.24) 
Association member -0.442*** 0.799*** 1.122***  -0.441*** 0.796*** 1.120*** 
 (-8.051) (6.104) (21.62)  (-8.030) (6.089) (21.58) 
Female 0.121*** 0.259** 0.0347  0.122*** 0.260** 0.0351 
 (4.365) (2.600) (0.778)  (4.391) (2.611) (0.787) 
Age -0.917*** -2.174*** -0.682***  -0.916*** -2.173*** -0.680*** 
 (-28.43) (-15.93) (-12.60)  (-28.40) (-15.92) (-12.55) 
Union member -0.469*** 0.148 0.641***  -0.468*** 0.150 0.642*** 
 (-9.797) (0.994) (11.84)  (-9.785) (1.008) (11.86) 
Feeling about income 0.318*** 0.417*** 0.221***  0.319*** 0.417*** 0.222*** 
 (10.12) (3.824) (4.284)  (10.14) (3.824) (4.304) 
Constant -1.971*** -5.288*** -3.214***  -1.973*** -5.207*** -3.219*** 
 (-17.23) (-12.68) (-19.10)  (-17.20) (-12.47) (-19.07) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Nagelkerke R2 0.29 0.29 0.29  0.29 0.29 0.29 
Observations 40,381 40,381 40,381   40,381 40,381 40,381 
z-statistics in parentheses        




Variable Wording Valid N Mean SD min max 
Dependent Variables              
Vote  "Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?" Coded 0 
for No, and 1 for Yes 
45,800 0.76 0.42 0 1 
Demonstrate  "There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent 
things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the 
following?. Taken part in a lawful demonstration?" Coded 0 for No, and 1 for Yes 
49,823 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Types of participation (Categorical):  Variable based on vote and demonstration variables. Four different categories: 
neither votes nor demonstrates; only votes; only demonstrates; both votes and 
demonstrates.       
 - Neither votes nor demonstrates 10,274 0.23    
 
- Only votes 32,153 0.7    
 - Only demonstrates 503 0.01    
 
- Both votes and demonstrates 2,724 0.06    
Independent variables              
Evaluations quality representative channel (Factor) Four indicators capturing citizens evaluation of different aspects of their 
democracies (see below for question wording). Variable calculated through 
principal components factor analysis with regression scoring assumed.  
44,582 0 1 -3.37 1.72 
Age  Age in years 49,885 48.41 18.60 15 103 
Political interest "How interested would you say you are in politics- are you: very interested, quite 
interested, hardly interested, or not at all interested". Higher values correspond 
to higher levels of political interest.  
49,835 2.35 0.92 1 4 
Gender  Gender of the respondent. Coded 1 = female  49,994 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Union membership "Are you or have you ever been member of a trade union or similar 
organization? If Yes, is that currently or previously?". Coded 1 for those who are 
member currently and 0 for all other responses 
49,694 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Association membership  
During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?. Worked in an 
organization or association?" Coded 0 for No, and 1 for Yes  
49,833 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Supports winner  "Is there a particular party you fell closer to than all the other parties? Which 
one? Coded 1 if respondent identifies or feels close to any of the parties in 
government.  
50,011 0.21 0.41 0 1 
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Education (Categorical):  "What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?" 
Categories adapted to each country in which the survey was conducted and later 
recoded into the ESS Education Detailed ISCED Coding Frame. From this 
categories and according to the ISCED classification we divided the sample in 
three different groups: Primary or less; Secondary; University        
 - Primary 5,653 0.11     
 - Secondary 30,563 0.61     
 - University  13,438 0.27    
Feeling about income Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your 
household's income nowadays? (1) Living comfortably on present income. (2) 
Coping on present income. (3) Finding it difficult on present income. (4) Finding it 
very difficult on present income. Higher values correspond to more difficulties on 
present income 
49,425 2.15 0.91 1 4 
Compulsory voting (country-level)* Coded 1 for those countries that enforce compulsory voting according to IDEA 
database, coded 0 for all other countries 50,011 0.06 0.24 0 1 
System openness (country-level) Variable measuring the openness of the political system following Dalton et al. 
(2010). Based on the World Bank rule of law indicator. Higher values indicate 
higher openness  
50,011 1.15 0.67 -0.57 1.95 
Indicators evaluations quality representative channel             
Introductory statement common to all questions "Now some questions about the same topics, but this time about how you think 
democracy is working in [country] today. Again, there are no right or wrong 
answers, so please just tell me what you think. Using this card, please tell me to 
what extent you think each of the following statements applies in [country]. 0 
means you think the statement does not apply at all and 10 means you think it 
applies completely."      
Free elections National elections in [country] are free and fair. 48,081 7.24 2.80 0 10 
Parties freedom Opposition parties in [country] are free to criticize the government . 47,647 7.55 2.36 0 10 
Vertical accountability (elections decisiveness) 
Government parties in [country] are punished in elections when they have done 
a bad job. 
46,985 5.60 3.07 0 10 
Differentiated partisan offer   Different political parties in [country] offer clear alternatives to one another. 47,029 5.62 2.55 0 10 
Note: All values correspond to the original variables before rescaling. See endnote 12 for further information. Valid N corresponds to the answers for given item after excluding non-
response (don’t know, no answer and not applicable categories). Non-response figures for each variable can be obtained by subtracting the valid N from 50,011, which corresponds to 
the sample size.  






  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Vote Demonstrate Vote Demonstrate 
Evaluations 0.199*** -0.235*** 0.251** 0.297 
 (7.114) (-5.313) (3.131) (1.868) 
Education (cat). Reference: primary     
Secondary 0.156** 0.262** 0.150** 0.255** 
 (3.151) (2.867) (2.988) (2.781) 
University 0.590*** 0.577*** 0.586*** 0.568*** 
 (10.37) (6.007) (10.20) (5.912) 
Interaction. Evaluation * Education     
Evaluation * Secondary   -0.0667 -0.503** 
   (-0.780) (-3.008) 
Evaluation * University   -0.0276 -0.685*** 
   (-0.278) (-3.980) 
Supports winner 1.013*** -0.0877 1.013*** -0.0847 
 (23.37) (-1.709) (23.37) (-1.651) 
Political interest 1.067*** 0.953*** 1.066*** 0.952*** 
 (34.44) (20.75) (34.43) (20.73) 
Association member  0.441*** 1.143*** 0.441*** 1.141*** 
 (8.699) (23.21) (8.695) (23.17) 
Female -0.120*** 0.0468 -0.120*** 0.0478 
 (-4.463) (1.138) (-4.486) (1.159) 
Age 0.931*** -0.737*** 0.931*** -0.735*** 
 (29.75) (-14.71) (29.74) (-14.66) 
Union member 0.485*** 0.643*** 0.485*** 0.643*** 
 (10.62) (12.47) (10.62) (12.47) 
Feeling income -0.321*** 0.190*** -0.321*** 0.190*** 
 (-10.58) (4.017) (-10.58) (4.019) 
Constant 1.899*** -3.198*** 1.904*** -3.190*** 
 (17.20) (-20.50) (17.21) (-20.41) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nagelkerke R2 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.2 
Observations 40,751 40,751 40,751 40,751 
Standard errors in parentheses         




  Non-interactive model   Interactive model 
Reference category: Only votes 




 Votes and 
demonstrates  




 Votes and 
demonstrates 
         
Evaluations -0.194*** -0.532*** -0.222***  -0.244** -0.0566 0.314 
 (-6.731) (-5.333) (-4.599)  (-2.991) (-0.159) (1.776) 
Education (cat). Reference: primary        
Secondary -0.141** -0.0848 0.294**  -0.133** -0.137 0.300** 
 (-2.793) (-0.413) (2.925)  (-2.599) (-0.654) (2.968) 
University -0.582*** -0.0724 0.582***  -0.573*** -0.176 0.591*** 
 (-9.966) (-0.328) (5.549)  (-9.727) (-0.781) (5.604) 
Interaction. Evaluation * Education        
Evaluation * Secondary     0.0623 -0.413 -0.517** 
     (0.715) (-1.104) (-2.784) 
Evaluation * University     0.0453 -0.743 -0.664*** 
     (0.444) (-1.885) (-3.497) 
Supports winner -1.027*** -0.882*** -0.124*  -1.027*** -0.878*** -0.121* 
 (-23.06) (-5.223) (-2.324)  (-23.07) (-5.200) (-2.274) 
Political Interest -1.075*** 0.0786 0.878***  -1.075*** 0.0782 0.878*** 
 (-33.44) (0.742) (17.36)  (-33.44) (0.739) (17.35) 
Association member -0.443*** 0.784*** 1.126***  -0.442*** 0.782*** 1.124*** 
 (-8.097) (6.010) (21.73)  (-8.087) (5.995) (21.70) 
Female 0.114*** 0.266** 0.0341  0.114*** 0.268** 0.0343 
 (4.136) (2.684) (0.765)  (4.150) (2.708) (0.771) 
Age -0.913*** -2.173*** -0.681***  -0.912*** -2.171*** -0.679*** 
 (-28.54) (-16.00) (-12.61)  (-28.53) (-15.98) (-12.55) 
Union member -0.472*** 0.142 0.640***  -0.472*** 0.142 0.640*** 
 (-9.903) (0.956) (11.83)  (-9.910) (0.954) (11.83) 
Feeling about income 0.331*** 0.425*** 0.229***  0.331*** 0.423*** 0.229*** 
 (10.64) (3.916) (4.445)  (10.64) (3.902) (4.445) 
Constant -1.909*** -5.170*** -3.184***  -1.917*** -5.107*** -3.189*** 
 (-16.82) (-12.48) (-19.06)  (-16.85) (-12.30) (-19.04) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Nagelkerke R2 0.29 0.29 0.29  0.29 0.29 0.29 
Observations 40,751 40,751 40,751   40,751 40,751 40,751 
z-statistics in parentheses        






     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Vote Demonstrate Vote Demonstrate 
Evaluations 0.276*** -0.229*** 0.270*** 0.327* 
	 (9.425) (-4.921) (3.316) (1.995) 
Education (cat). Reference: primary     
Secondary 0.159** 0.249** 0.157** 0.237** 
	 (3.196) (2.725) (3.106) (2.582) 
University 0.585*** 0.569*** 0.588*** 0.561*** 
	 (10.21) (5.925) (10.15) (5.835) 
Interaction: Evaluation * Education     
Evaluation * Secondary   -0.0134 -0.525** 
	   (-0.155) (-3.056) 
Evaluation * University   0.0818 -0.723*** 
	   (0.819) (-4.088) 
Supports winner 1.001*** -0.0889 1.000*** -0.0854 
	 (22.96) (-1.729) (22.94) (-1.661) 
Political interest 1.052*** 0.950*** 1.052*** 0.950*** 
	 (33.76) (20.61) (33.75) (20.60) 
Association member  0.443*** 1.141*** 0.442*** 1.139*** 
	 (8.713) (23.15) (8.704) (23.12) 
Female -0.126*** 0.0452 -0.127*** 0.0461 
	 (-4.669) (1.096) (-4.701) (1.116) 
Age 0.933*** -0.737*** 0.932*** -0.736*** 
	 (29.59) (-14.71) (29.56) (-14.66) 
Union member 0.495*** 0.641*** 0.495*** 0.643*** 
	 (10.79) (12.45) (10.78) (12.47) 
Feeling about income -0.308*** 0.184*** -0.309*** 0.185*** 
	 (-10.09) (3.887) (-10.11) (3.910) 
Compulsory voting 0.612*  0.613*  
	 (2.061)  (2.068)  
System openness -0.179 -0.399* -0.179 -0.391 
	 (-1.639) (-1.998) (-1.642) (-1.958) 
Constant 1.146*** -3.164*** 1.146*** -3.159*** 
	 (7.570) (-11.43) (7.570) (-11.42) 
Random effects parameters     
Constant (var)  0.154*** 0.531*** 0.154*** 0.529*** 	 (3.481) (3.562) (3.480) (3.562) 
Observations (countries) 27 27 27 27 
Observations (Individuals) 40,381 40,381 40,381 40,381 
z-statistics in parentheses  	 	 	 	




  Non-interactive model   Interactive model 
Reference category: Only votes Neither votes nor demonstrates 
Demonstrates 
only 
 Votes and 
demonstrates  




 Votes and 
demonstrates 
Evaluations -0.270*** -0.674*** -0.237***  -0.258** -0.0709 0.276 
 (-9.084) (-6.723) (-4.827)  (-3.121) (-0.199) (1.556) 
Education (cat). Reference: primary        
Secondary 0.0199 -0.505** -0.150  0.0247 -0.593** -0.147 
 (0.399) (-2.583) (-1.578)  (0.485) (-2.961) (-1.532) 
University -0.412*** -0.505* 0.102  -0.408*** -0.626** 0.113 
 (-7.117) (-2.404) (1.027)  (-6.959) (-2.917) (1.138) 
Interaction: Evaluation * Education        
Evaluation * Secondary     0.00845 -0.570 -0.470* 
     (0.0960) (-1.535) (-2.532) 
Evaluation * University     -0.0878 -0.836* -0.676*** 
     (-0.854) (-2.143) (-3.560) 
Supports winner -0.952*** -0.950*** -0.292***  -0.952*** -0.946*** -0.289*** 
 (-21.51) (-5.728) (-5.624)  (-21.50) (-5.701) (-5.559) 
Political Interest -1.024*** 0.101 0.894***  -1.024*** 0.103 0.894*** 
 (-32.24) (0.944) (17.78)  (-32.25) (0.967) (17.78) 
Association member -0.476*** 0.839*** 1.155***  -0.476*** 0.841*** 1.155*** 
 (-8.741) (6.567) (23.19)  (-8.737) (6.583) (23.20) 
Female 0.114*** 0.278** 0.0358  0.115*** 0.279** 0.0366 
 (4.121) (2.816) (0.823)  (4.150) (2.821) (0.840) 
Age -0.874*** -2.207*** -0.788***  -0.872*** -2.208*** -0.786*** 
 (-27.26) (-16.87) (-15.16)  (-27.22) (-16.86) (-15.11) 
Union member -0.482*** -0.0387 0.645***  -0.482*** -0.0321 0.648*** 
 (-10.33) (-0.269) (12.66)  (-10.33) (-0.223) (12.71) 
Feeling about income 0.313*** 0.369*** 0.187***  0.314*** 0.372*** 0.190*** 
 (10.13) (3.469) (3.739)  (10.17) (3.500) (3.786) 
Compulsory voting -0.614* -0.973* -0.394  -0.616* -0.982* -0.403 
 (-2.308) (-2.421) (-1.428)  (-2.329) (-2.447) (-1.465) 
System openness 0.157 -0.167 -0.300**  0.157 -0.162 -0.296** 
 (1.604) (-1.337) (-2.940)  (1.616) (-1.297) (-2.923) 
Constant -1.246*** -3.981*** -2.569***  -1.249*** -3.894*** -2.576*** 
 (-9.063) (-15.93) (-15.90)  (-9.112) (-15.58) (-15.96) 
Random effects parameters        
Constant (var) 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122***  0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121***  (3.501) -3.501 -3.501  (3.499) -3.499 -3.499 
Observations (countries) 27 27 27  27 27 27 
Observations (individuals) 40,381 40,381 40,381   40,381 40,381 40,381 
z-statistics in parentheses        
	
	 41	
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05        
	
